

晶片卡弱點分析

MIFARE, ATM Card & 花博門票

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
Agenda

- MIFARE 安全漏洞探討
- ATM Card與網路ATM安全漏洞探討
- 台北國際花博覽會門票安全漏洞探討

Introduction of MIFARE

- RF ID (ISO 14443-3 Type A with MIFARE, 13.56 MHz, Distance 10 cm)
- Memory Card (S50 1K bytes, S70 4K bytes)

$16 * 64 = 1024 \text{ bytes} = 1\text{K bytes}$



Weakness I of MIFARE

Key Length

- Key Length of MIFARE Key A/B is 48 bits
 - Key length of Triple DES is 112 or 168 bits and key length of AES is 128 , 192 or 256 bits
 - Key won't lock even if key authentication failed too many times!



Brute Force Attack!!!!

(圖片來自於網路)

=> By the thesis, we can use 100 reader at the same time to get 1 key in 2 weeks...


Weakness II of MIFARE

Random Number Generator

- The Random Number Generator is designed by LFSR-32 bits...
 - But... the seed is decided by the value of timer... and the timer will start to count from power on...
 - If We can control the timing... we can control the random number!

Weakness III of MIFARE

Crypto 1 Algorithm





Three Pass Authentication

Reader

TAG

Anti-Collision & Select Card (UID)



Auth Block (Key A / B)



Ntag



$N_r \wedge KS1, \text{Suc}^2(N_{tag}) \wedge KS2$



$\text{Suc}^3(N_{tag}) \wedge KS3$





MIFARE Against from Weakness

- 防偽驗證碼 (by DES or Triple-DES)
- 黑名單機制與卡片鎖卡旗標
- 除特定消費方式,大部分交通應用或小額消費均有攝影機...




Introduction of ATM Card

- Personal Data (Account, Bank ID.. etc)
- User PIN
- Authentication Keys between Bank and Card
- Supporting DES, Triple-DES and TAC algorithm
- Secured Hardware with EAL 4+

Transaction of ATM Card


Weakless : PIN明碼傳輸



Weakless : 中心無提供必要資訊給ATM Card作為產生 TAC 用


Weakless : Verify PIN後可產生多次TAC

Transaction of ATM Card



Middle-Man-Attack on ATM Card

2. Web ATM will send **Data A** to ATM card,
but the Troja will change the **Data A to B**
3. ATM Card will generate the TAC of **Data B...**
4. Web ATM send **Data A | TAC B**
5. Browser send **Data B | TAC B**



Troja to attack ATM Card and Web ATM

SSL to protect the data transfer...
But Hacker uses Middle-Man-Attack...


Conclusion of Web ATM and ATM Card

- 不要使用網路ATM...



2010台北國際花博門票介紹

- 一日票, 三日票, Easy Card and CHT NFC
- 一日,三日票使用MIFARE Ultra Light
- Memory Card (64 bytes only)
- 無金鑰區塊





Example 1 of 花博門票

UID	OTP Flag	OTP Data
1474B85B02CB1B8052	480000	6C72DBD0
578EC88700000000000000C080000F303		
00000000000001020801100000000001		
FD3A0000000000000000000000F181B21A		




Attacking of 花博門票 - Clone

- Clone Card – 事先購買團體票後,進行卡片所有資料之Clone... 並且偽造相同資料之卡片,即可有兩張同資料之卡片可供使用
(若無黑名單機制,Clone之卡可無限進行重置繼續使用)



Attacking of 花博門票- Change

- 修改卡片內容 – 將卡片內註記為一日或三日卡的部份修改為3日
- 若進場後,註記進場時間,但未註記出場時間或未將OTP flag關閉,可將本資料清除或將原始卡片資料寫入,又是一張未使用的卡
- 其他



Thank You!!

Q & A